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a b s t r a c t
In this work we consider the following primitive, that we call restricted adaptive oblivious
transfer. On the one hand, the owner of a database wants to restrict the access of users to
this data according to some policy, in such a way that a user can only obtain information
satisfying the restrictions imposed by the owner. On the other hand, a legitimate userwants
to privately retrieve allowed parts of the data, in a sequential and adaptive way, without
letting the owner know which part of the data is being obtained.
After having formally described the components and required properties of a protocol
for restricted adaptive oblivious transfer, we propose two generic ways to realize this
primitive. The first one uses a cryptographic tool which has received a lot of attention from
the literature in recent years: cryptosystemswhich are bothmultiplicatively and additively
homomorphic. Our second generic construction is based on secret sharing schemes.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
With the growth of the Internet, many practical situations involving operations on digital confidential data appear
constantly. On the one hand, the owner of the data wants it to remain private against those users who do not have the
right to access it. This can be achieved by keeping the data in a secure device, or by encrypting it. Many examples of such
confidential databases can be found in the areas of medical analysis, electronic commerce, banking, or digital business in
general. On the other hand, some users can have the right to access some parts of this confidential data, because of their
role (doctors) or because they pay for it. In some situations, these allowed users may want to keep private what part of the
data they are retrieving. Imagine the following motivating example inspired by pay per view systems: a TV channel over the
Internet broadcasts different programs (films, sport events) which can be watched only by those clients who have paid for
them. A client may pay a registration fee which gives him the right of watching five films and ten football matches in the
current month, for example. A solution for the TV channel is to keep a private database containing one password for each
program, and then to allow the download of the program only to those users having the corresponding password. If a client
has paid only to watch films, he should have access only to the part of the database which contains the passwords for the
films. On the other hand, when asking for a password to watch a film, maybe the client does not want the TV channel to
know which film he is going to watch.
Summing up, there are situations where both the owner of the data (from now on, the server) and the users who have
access to some parts of the data (from now on, the clients) want to preserve some kind of privacy. The server wants to
restrict the access of each client to his data, by means of some policy; these restrictions can be defined by (decreasingly)
monotone families, containing the subsets of items that are allowed to be retrieved. The clients can ask for retrieval of
different items, in a sequential and adaptive (i.e., possibly depending on the previously retrieved items) way, and should
obtain these items, as long as they form a subset of allowed items, without letting the server know which items have been
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retrieved. We denote this problem as restricted adaptive oblivious transfer. The cryptographic primitive of standard oblivious
transfer [21,8] provides an interactive protocol between a server and a client: the client retrieves an item dbi, and nothing
else, from a database DB = {db1, . . . , dbN} of secret items maintained by the server, who does not obtain any information
about the index i (chosen by the client) of the retrieved item. Of course, such a protocol does not solve, by itself, our problem
of restricted adaptive oblivious transfer: since the server does not know the index of the currently queried item, he cannot
decide if the client has (still) the right to obtain this item.
1.1. Related work
Ishai and Kushilevitz introduced in [18] a primitive that they called generalized oblivious transfer (GOT), which can be
seen as a non-sequential (and, thus, non-adaptive) counterpart of the primitive that we consider here, restricted adaptive
oblivious transfer. In a GOT protocol, the server defines a monotone family of restrictions, as well; however, the client must
decide at the same time the whole subset of items (satisfying the restrictions) in the database he wants to retrieve. The
retrieval protocol is executed only once, and the client receives all the queried items together. The solution proposed in
[18] uses parallel instances of a standard oblivious transfer protocol (with N = 2). This is why the authors used the term
‘generalized oblivious transfer’ to define this primitive. Different solutions to implement GOT have been proposed in [24,26],
by combining secret sharing schemes and parallel instances of standard oblivious transfer. However, since the use of parallel
instances of standard oblivious transfer is not mandatory to realize this primitive (as we will see in this paper), and since
the name ‘generalized oblivious transfer’ has already been used for other different extensions of the concept of oblivious
transfer (see [7,6]), we have chosen a different name, ‘restricted adaptive oblivious transfer’, for the considered primitive,
and not ‘adaptive generalized oblivious transfer’, for example.
Wewant to stress here that themain difference between restricted adaptive oblivious transfer and generalized oblivious
transfer, i.e. the fact that queries can be made in a sequential and adaptive way, is of great importance in some applications.
For example, in a pay-per-view system, a client may want to see/buy a film of a particular director before deciding if he
wants to buy/see other films of this director.
Anyway, the concept of restricted adaptive oblivious transfer is not completely new. Aiello et al. [2] introduced and
realized the primitive of priced oblivious transfer, which is a particular case of restricted adaptive oblivious transfer: each
item of the database has a price, each client has a budget, and the client can privately retrieve/buy items, through the life
of the system, as long as his money balance (which is updated by the server at the end of each execution) remains positive.
Finally, an even more particular case is that of k-out-of-N oblivious transfer [19,12], where each client can run the retrieval
protocol at most k times, in a sequential and adaptive way.
Subsequent to the submission of this work, in 2008, other papers related to the concept of (restricted) adaptive oblivious
transfer have been published. For example, the work in [22] focuses on providing the property of fair exchange to the
primitive of priced oblivious transfer. Other works [10,11] deal with a variant of adaptive oblivious transfer where each
item of the database is associated to a policy, and only clients whose attributes satisfy this policy are allowed to obtain this
item, in a private and anonymous way.
1.2. Our contribution
In this paper we first describe in detail the general primitive of restricted adaptive oblivious transfer: how to model the
restrictions of clients, by using (decreasingly) monotone families of subsets; which are the inputs and outputs of each of
the protocols; and which are the required security properties for these protocols. Once this is done, we explain how priced
oblivious transfer can be recovered as a particular case of this primitive.
Then we present two solutions to the general problem of restricted adaptive oblivious transfer. The first one is inspired
by the solution presented in [2] to the problem of priced oblivious transfer. This first generic solution makes use of a
cryptographic tool that has received a lot of attention in recent years: public key encryption schemes which are at the
same time additively and multiplicatively homomorphic. We propose then a second solution, which uses well-known
cryptographic tools; actually, this second generic construction is inspired by a conceptual relation between restricted
adaptive oblivious transfer and secret sharing schemes.
1.3. Organization of the paper
In Section 2 we recall the concepts of oblivious transfer, homomorphic encryption, conditional disclosure of a value, and
secret sharing schemes. In Section 3 we describe in detail the primitive that we want to implement, restricted adaptive
oblivious transfer, and we briefly explain the particular case of priced oblivious transfer. We propose our first solution to
the general problem in Section 4, and we propose our second solution in Section 5. We conclude our work in Section 6.
2. Preliminaries
In this section we recall four cryptographic primitives which will appear in the solutions to the problem of restricted
adaptive oblivious transfer that we review or propose.
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2.1. 1-out-of-N oblivious transfer
The problem of 1-out-of-N oblivious transfer can be (informally) defined as follows: a server S stores a database DB
containing N items {dbi}1≤i≤N . By means of an interactive protocol, a client C wants to obtain the i-th item, dbi, for an index
i of his choice. The protocol must satisfy a correctness property (the client obtains the required item if both parties behave
correctly) and two privacy properties:
• Privacy for the client. At the end of the protocol, the server S obtains no information about the index i of the item dbi
which has been retrieved by the client.
• Privacy for the server. At the end of the protocol, the client C obtains no information about the other items dbj of the
database, where j ≠ i.
1-out-of-N oblivious transfer was introduced in [7,8] as a generalization of the original concept of oblivious transfer
introduced in [21].
2.2. Homomorphic encryption
A public key encryption scheme PKE = (KG, E,D) consists of three probabilistic and polynomial time algorithms. The
key generation algorithmKG takes as input a security parameter (for example, the desired length for the secret key) and
outputs a pair (sk, pk) of secret and public keys. The encryption algorithm takes as input a plaintextm and a public key pk,
and outputs a ciphertext c = Epk(m). Finally, the decryption algorithm takes as input a ciphertext and a secret key, and gives
a plaintext m = Dsk(c) as output. Roughly speaking, a public key encryption scheme is secure if a ciphertext does not leak
any information at all about the encrypted plaintext.
Such a scheme has an homomorphic property if there exist two operations, defined on the set of ciphertexts and
plaintexts, respectively, such that the result of operating two ciphertexts is an encryption of the result of operating the two
corresponding plaintexts. For example, a public key cryptosystem is additively homomorphic if there exists an operation⊕
defined on the set of ciphertexts, such that the message encrypted in c1⊕ c2 ism1+m2, wheremi is the message encrypted
in ci, for i = 1, 2. Formally, this property is written as
Dsk

Epk(m1)⊕ Epk(m2)
 = m1 +m2.
Analogously, a cryptosystem is multiplicatively homomorphic if there exists an operation ⊗ defined on the set of
ciphertexts, such that Dsk

Epk(m1) ⊗ Epk(m1)
 = m1 · m2, for any pair of plaintexts (m1,m2). Of course, these definitions
make sense only if the multiplication and addition operations are properly defined on the set of plaintexts.
ElGamal cryptosystem [14] is the classical example of a multiplicatively homomorphic scheme, whereas Paillier’s one
[20] is an additively homomorphic encryption scheme. In recent years, different public key encryption schemes which
are, at the same time, additively and multiplicatively homomorphic have been proposed [5,15,16,1]. These schemes are
also known as fully homomorphic encryption schemes. Homomorphic cryptosystems have a lot of applications, including
electronic auctions, electronic voting and cloud computing.
2.3. Conditional disclosure of secrets
The general conditional disclosure primitive was introduced in [17]. In this work we are interested in the following
particular case: a server holds a secret value s, a message m and a public key pk corresponding to some (additively
homomorphic) cryptosystem PKE. A user holds the matching secret key sk, and a message m′. By using the conditional
disclosure primitive, the user gives Epk(m′) to the server, and he must obtain secret s from the server if and only if the
conditionm′ = m is satisfied. The server must obtain no information aboutm′.
This primitive can be realized in the following way: after receiving Epk(m′), the server takes at random an element α and,
using the homomorphic property of PKE, computes an encryption c of β = α(m − m′) + s. The server sends c to the user,
who can use sk to decrypt and obtain β , which is equal to the secret s ifm = m′, and is a random value otherwise.
This simple protocol solves the conditional disclosure problem in the case of a single equality between a value known to
the server and an encrypted value. The more general case where the condition is a monotone formula with equality leaves
can be similarly solved, using the following recursive method, as proposed in [2]. On the one hand, to realize the conditional
disclosure of secret s under condition C1∨C2, one can run two independent instances of the protocol, one under condition C1
and the other under condition C2. On the other hand, to realize the conditional disclosure of secret s under condition C1∧C2,
one can choose r at random and run two independent instances of the conditional disclosure protocol, one for secret r under
condition C1, and the other for secret s+ r under condition C2.
2.4. Secret sharing schemes
In a secret sharing scheme, shares of a secret value are distributed among a setP = {1, . . . ,N} of N players, according to
some access structure Γ ⊂ 2P , which is increasingly monotone: if A1 ∈ Γ and A1 ⊂ A2, then A2 ∈ Γ , for any A1, A2 ⊂ P . If
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the scheme is perfect, only authorized subsets of players (those inΓ ) can recover the secret value from their shares, whereas
non-authorized subsets (those out of Γ ) do not obtain any information about the secret.
Secret sharing schemes were introduced independently by Shamir [23] and Blakley [4] in 1979. Shamir considered
threshold access structures Γ = {A ⊂ P : |A| ≥ t} defined by a threshold t , and proposed a secret sharing scheme for
these structures, based on polynomial interpolation. Other works have proposed schemes realizing more general access
structures, such as vector space secret sharing schemes [9]. An access structure Γ is realizable by such a scheme, in a finite
field Zq for some prime q, if there exist a positive integer r and an assignment of vectors ψ : P ∪ {D} −→ (Zq)r (one for
each participant) such that A ∈ Γ if and only ifψ(D) is a linear combination of the vectors in {ψ(i)}i∈A, for any A ⊂ P . Here
D denotes a special entity (real or not), called the dealer, outside the set P . If a real dealer D wants to share a secret s ∈ Zq
among the players in P , he chooses a random vector v⃗ ∈ (Zq)r such that v⃗ · ψ(D) = s. The share of each player i ∈ P is
si = v⃗ · ψ(i). If A ∈ Γ , there exist values {λAi }i∈A such that ψ(D) =
∑
i∈A
λAi ψ(i). Then, it is easy to see that s =
∑
i∈A
λAi si mod q.
Using simple linear algebra, one can also see that subsets out of Γ obtain no information at all about the secret value s. In
other words, any possible secret s′ ∈ Zq is equally likely from the point of view of a non-authorized subset.
Simmons, et al. [25] introduced linear secret sharing schemes, which can be seen as a generalization of vector space secret
sharing schemes where each player can be assigned more than one vector (and therefore, the length of each share can be
larger than the secret). They proved that any access structure can be realized by a linear secret sharing scheme.
3. Restricted adaptive oblivious transfer
In this section we explain in more detail the general functionality of restricted adaptive oblivious transfer (phases,
inputs/outputs of the protocols, desired security properties). We then review some particular cases of this functionality,
which can be realized quite directly by using existing results.
3.1. Definitions: functionality and properties
Let us remember the functionality we want to implement: a server S maintains a secret database DB = {db1, . . . , dbN}
with N entries/items, and a policy defining which subsets of entries of the database can be available, on request, to the
different clients. A client wants his requests to be private, i.e. the server should not obtain any information about the item(s)
that the client is requesting. The server wants to be sure that a client C will not obtain any information about items of the
database which are not allowed to C . In general, a solution fulfilling this functionality will consist of two protocols:
• 1st protocol: defining rights. This phase should be run offline, maybe before the specific values of the entries {dbi}1≤i≤N
of the database are defined. LetP = {1, 2, . . . ,N} denote the set of indices of the items in the database. For a particular
client C , the server S specifies the family BC ⊂ 2P of subsets of items that client C is allowed to obtain. Of course, BC
must be a decreasingly monotone family: if B1 ∈ BC is allowed, and B2 ⊂ B1, then B2 ∈ BC is allowed, as well. The
familyBC is known by both S and C . The server S stores an information infoC related to C , which initially containsBC
and which is updated by S each time C requests an item of the database. Possibly, the client C receives some additional
information αC from S, to be used in the future requests.
• 2nd protocol: request and retrieval. The input for the client C includes αC and the index i corresponding to the entry
dbi he wants to retrieve from the database. The input for the server consists of the database DB and infoC . At the end
of the protocol, S must update his information infoC , and C obtains a value outi. Assume that this is the t-th time that
C executes this protocol with S, and that previous executions had inputs i1, . . . , it−1. Let us define the subset of indices
B = {i1, . . . , it−1, i}. Then C obtains the desired value, i.e. outi = dbi, if and only if B ∈ BC .
A scheme for this functionality of restricted adaptive oblivious transfer will be considered valid if it satisfies some
requirements. Assume that the t-th execution of the protocol has input (it , αC ) for C , where it ∈ {1, . . . ,N}. The first
requirement is a typical correctness one: if the client and the server behave honestly during the t-th execution and if
{i1, . . . , it} ∈ BC , then outit = dbit is the secret output of C . Additionally, two privacy properties are required.
• Privacy for the client. In any execution of the protocol for request and retrieval of an item, the server S does not obtain
any information about the index i in the input of the client.
• Privacy for the server. In the t-th execution of the ‘request and retrieval’ protocol, with input (it , αC ), the client C
– does not obtain any information about items dbℓ, for ℓ ≠ it ; and
– does not obtain any information about item dbit , if {i1, . . . , it} /∈ BC .
Of course, a malicious server can always refuse to execute his part of the protocol. There is nothing we can do about it.
However, there are quite standard ways to avoid other possible misbehaviors of the server. For example, a dishonest server
could arbitrarily modify his database, and run the request and retrieval protocol with entries db′j different than the correct
ones, dbj. In this way, clients would obtain invalid items as answers to their queries. To avoid this problem, the server can be
required to publish a cryptographic commitment of each entry in the database, in a setup phase of the system. Later, in case
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of dispute, a judge can forge the server to open the corresponding commitments and take a decision. See [22] for a more
detailed and formal treatment of the fair exchange issue in this kind of protocols.
In the rest of the paper, for simplicity, we will assume that the server behaves honestly, i.e. he does not refuse any query
of a client, and he uses the correct values dbj of the items as the inputs of the corresponding protocols.
3.2. A particular case: priced oblivious transfer
When the familyBC ⊂ 2P is a weighted threshold family, whichmeans that there exist a threshold β and an assignment
of positive weights ω : P → Z+ such that
BC =

B ⊂ P s.t.
−
i∈B
ω(i) ≤ β

,
then we recover priced oblivious transfer [2], where elements of the database are supposed to be objects (or goods) with
a price, and users have different budgets to privately buy goods. In the solution given in [2], the prices of the objects are
the same for all the users/buyers. But their solution can be applied in general to the restricted adaptive oblivious transfer
problem where each user can have different restrictions (not only the budget), as long as all the restriction familiesBC are
weighted threshold.
Namely, assume that the restrictions of a client are described by a weighted threshold familyBC , which is realized by a
threshold β and an assignment of weightsω : P → Z+. All this information is known by both the client and the server. We
present a brief sketch of how the basic solution proposed in [2] would work.
• All the weights are assumed to be different (if necessary, by scaling them and the threshold with a large enough factor):
ω(i) ≠ ω(j), if i ≠ j.
• The client generates a pair of secret/public keys (sk, pk) for an additively homomorphic cryptosystem; encryption is
denoted as c = Epk(m).• The server encrypts c = Epk(β).• If the client wants to retrieve element dbi, he sends c˜ = Epk(ω(i)) to the server, along with a (cryptographic) proof that
the value encrypted in c is greater or equal than the value encrypted in c˜. The client adds a standard oblivious transfer
query for the index i.
• The server verifies that the validity proof is correct. If so, he answers the standard oblivious transfer query, and updates
c = c ⊖ c˜ = Epk(β − ω(i)), for possible future executions of the protocol with the same client.• The client recovers dbi using the last step of the oblivious transfer protocol, and updates β = β − ω(i) and c = c ⊖ c˜ .
This solution forces the server to store a lot of different information (the threshold β , the assignment of weights ω, the
ciphertext c) for each client. This drawback, as well as some of the techniques used in the priced oblivious transfer protocols
of [2], will appear in the first generic solution to the problem of restricted adaptive oblivious transfer that we present in the
next section.
4. A first generic solution
The particular case of priced oblivious transfer does not cover all the possible cases of restricted adaptive oblivious
transfer. For example, suppose that a database DB = {db1, db2, db3, db4} contains four items, and that a client C is allowed
to retrieve items in one of the subsets of indices defined by the familyBC = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}}. It is easy to see that this
family cannot be a weighted threshold (actually, this is an example of a non-weighted threshold family proposed in [3]).
Therefore, the ideas of priced oblivious transfer cannot be used here. This case cannot be solved, either, by using predicate
encryption techniques.
We propose in this section a first generic solution which works for any possible family BC of restrictions. It can be
seen as a generalization of the protocols in [2] for priced oblivious transfer. It employs as a building block a cryptosystem
PKE = (KG, E,D) which is both multiplicatively and additively homomorphic, with operations ⊗ and ⊕ defined on the
set of ciphertexts, satisfying for any two plaintextsm1,m2:
Dsk

Epk(m1)⊗ Epk(m2)
 = m1 ·m2, and
Dsk

Epk(m1)⊕ Epk(m2)
 = m1 +m2.
The two protocols of the generic solution that we propose work as follows.
4.1. 1st protocol: defining rights
Let BC = {B1, B2, . . . , Bs} ⊂ 2P be the family of subsets of indices expressing the collections of items that client C is
allowed to query, where P = {1, 2, . . . ,N}. In general, we will have Bj = {ij,1, ij,2, . . . , ij,nj} ⊂ P . We represent each of
these subsets Bj with its incidence vector, a length N binary vector b⃗j = (b(j)1 , b(j)2 , . . . , b(j)N ) ∈ {0, 1}N , such that b(j)i = 1 if
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and only if i ∈ Bj, for i = 1, 2, . . . ,N . For simplicity of notation, we will sometimes skip the super-index (j), when it is clear
from the context.
The client generates a pair of keys (pk, sk) ← KG(1k) for the homomorphic cryptosystem PKE, and publishes pk.
The server computes an encryption of BC , by encrypting all the vectors b⃗j coordinate-wise. In other words, he computes
c⃗j = (Epk(b(j)1 ), . . . , Epk(b(j)N )), for j = 1, . . . , s. He also chooses a value u0. Initially, he sets infoC = (pk, u0, {c⃗j}j=1,...,s).
4.2. 2nd protocol: request and retrieval
If the client wants to retrieve the item dbi, then he must encrypt the vector e⃗ = (e1, . . . , eN) ∈ {0, 1}N , which has a 1 in
the i-th position, ei = 1, and a 0 everywhere else, eℓ = 0, ∀ℓ ≠ i. The result is a vector of ciphertexts c⃗ = (c1, c2, . . . , cN) =
Epk(e1), . . . , Epk(eN)

. If the client has behaved honestly, then the value
c˜ =
N
ℓ=1
(dbℓ)cℓ
is an encryption of dbi, due to the (additively) homomorphic properties of the scheme PKE. Now the server has to update
the access family BC , because the i-th item has been already queried and will be released. For each subset Bj ∈ BC , the
server updates its representation vector b⃗j, by replacing a 1 with a 0 in the i-th position, if b
(j)
i = 1 (which means that index
i belonged to Bj) and by setting all the vector b⃗j to 0, if b
(j)
i = 0 (which means that the client has asked for an item which
was not in Bj, and so the subset Bj must not be considered any more). This is done via the formula
b⃗′j = [b⃗j · e⃗](b⃗j − e⃗),
where b⃗′j denotes the updated version of the vector associated to subset Bj. The server must perform this operation over
encrypted data, c⃗ ′j = [c⃗j⊙ c⃗](c⃗j − c⃗)where (c1, . . . , cN)⊙ (c ′1, . . . , c ′N) = (c1⊗ c ′1)⊕ . . .⊕ (cN⊗ c ′N); this is the point where
we need PKE to be both multiplicatively and additively homomorphic. Furthermore, we will have to perform two levels of
products of ciphertexts, one for the ‘scalar’ product c⃗j ⊙ c⃗ , and another one to multiply the resulting ciphertext with each
component of the vector of ciphertexts (c⃗j − c⃗). For this reason, the scheme in [5], which allows only one level of products
of ciphertexts, cannot be used here.
Of course, we have to consider the possibility of dishonest clients. The server will release to the client this value c˜
(an encryption of dbi), conditioned to the fact that the query is correct, which means that:
(1) the client has behaved honestly in the previous executions of the protocol; and
(2) the vector of ciphertexts c⃗ = (c1, . . . , cN) contains exactly one encryption of 1, and N − 1 encryptions of 0; and
(3) the index i such that ci is an encryption of 1 still belongs to some subset Bj ∈ BC .
The first condition is ensured with a chaining technique [2]: in the t-th execution of the protocol, the client receives an
encryption of some value ut , if and only if the t-th query is correct. Then, in the (t+1)-th execution, the client must provide
an encryption of ut .
The second condition ensures that the clientwill obtain atmost one item, if any, and that the client cannot try to ‘‘increase"
his rights BC for the following interaction, by defining eℓ = −1 for some ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,N}, for example. The server will not
know which entry of c⃗ encrypts the value 1, but he will be convinced that c⃗ is well formed if the corresponding vector
e⃗ = (e1, . . . , eN) of plaintexts satisfies
N
i=1

ei = 1 ∧ eℓ = 0, ∀ℓ ≠ i

.
Finally, the third condition is equivalent to verify that the value encrypted in the scalar product b⃗j · c⃗ is 1, for some
j ∈ {1, . . . , s}. In effect, assuming that e⃗ is well formed, the scalar product of the plaintext vectors, b⃗j · e⃗, will be 1 if and only
if i ∈ Bj.
Putting all these pieces together, the t-th execution of this ‘request and retrieval’ protocol works as follows, for t ≥ 1.
(1) To retrieve item dbi, the client computes the vector e⃗ = (e1, . . . , eN) such that ei = 1 and eℓ = 0, ∀ℓ ≠ i, and encrypts
it coordinate-wise, to obtain c⃗ = (c1, . . . , cN), where cℓ = Epk(eℓ), for ℓ = 1, . . . ,N .
(2) The client sends c⃗ and Epk(u) to the server, where u = ut−1.
(3) The server chooses at random ut , and encrypts it. He also computes the value c˜ =
N
ℓ=1
(dbℓ)cℓ.
(4) By using the protocols/ideas explained in Section 2.3, the server performs a conditioneddisclosure of the pair (Epk(ut), c˜),
under the condition
N
i=1

ei = 1 ∧
N
ℓ=1,ℓ≠i
eℓ = 0
   s
j=1
b⃗j · e⃗ = 1
  
u = ut−1

.
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(5) The server updates the value of the encryptions of the vectors b⃗j, for j = 1, . . . , s. Remember that the correct update is
b⃗j := [b⃗j · e⃗](b⃗j − e⃗). Therefore, the server updates the ciphertexts
c⃗j := [c⃗j ⊙ c⃗](c⃗j − c⃗),
for j = 1, . . . , s. He replaces the old values of c⃗j with the new ones, in infoC , where he also replaces ut−1 with ut .
(6) If the client has always behaved honestly, he can recover the pair (Epk(ut), c˜) and decrypt both ciphertexts with sk,
obtaining in this way ut and the desired item dbi.
Because of the security properties of the encryption scheme and of the protocol for conditional disclosure of secrets, it
is easy to see that this protocol enjoys the required privacy properties for restricted adaptive oblivious transfer. The server
cannot obtain any information about the index i, and the client obtains item dbi only if he is allowed to do it.
5. A second generic solution
In this section we propose a second solution to the general problem of restricted adaptive oblivious transfer. Although
this second construction is less efficient than the first one in terms of computation and communication costs, it avoids the
use of fully homomorphic encryption schemes (note that existing realizations of fully homomorphic encryption are still
far from being really efficient). In contrast, our second construction uses rather simple and efficient cryptographic tools:
additively homomorphic cryptosystems, standard oblivious transfer, and secret sharing schemes.
It can seem quite natural to relate the concept of restricted adaptive oblivious transfer (where a decreasingly monotone
family BC appears) and the concept of secret sharing (where an increasingly monotone family Γ appears). Actually, the
proposal in [24] for the non-sequential case of ‘generalized oblivious transfer’ already uses secret sharing as an ingredient.
Let us sketch the basic ideas of our second solution. Given a familyBC ⊂ 2P defining the restrictions of a client C , the server
considers the increasingly monotone family
Γ = (BC )c = {A ⊂ P | A /∈ BC }.
For simplicity, we assume that Γ admits a vector space secret sharing scheme, defined by ψ : P ∪ {D} → (Zq)r . The
server can choose a vector v⃗ ∈ (Zq)r at random, such that all the shares si = v⃗ ·ψ(i) are different. The real secret would be
s = v⃗ ·ψ(D). Now, if we consider a different random value s′ ≠ s, the key point is that the system of equations x⃗·ψ(D) = s′,
{x⃗ · ψ(j) = sj}j∈B

, with vector of unknowns x⃗, will have a solution if and only if B /∈ Γ (otherwise, if B ∈ Γ , the real shares
of elements in Bwould completely determine the secret to be s, different from s′). In other words, the system has a solution
if and only if B ∈ BC .
During each execution of the ‘request and retrieval’ protocol, the client C should prove that he knows a solution x⃗ for such
a system of equations, being B the subset of all the indices that C has queried to the database (including the current one). If
this subset B is not allowed, then it will be inΓ and so C will not be able to provide such a solution to the systemof equations.
Of course, caremust be taken in order to preserve the privacy of the queries, and also to prevent a possible dishonest behavior
of a client who tries to cheat the server. The details of the protocols which compose our second solution are as follows.
5.1. 1st protocol: defining rights
Let BC ⊂ 2P be the family containing the allowed subsets of items for client C , where P = {1, 2, . . . ,N}. The server
considers the increasingly monotone family (or access structure) Γ = (BC )c = {A ⊂ P | A /∈ BC }, which admits
(for simplicity) a vector space access secret sharing scheme, defined by ψ : P ∪ {D} → (Zq)r . Without loss of generality
(for example by multiplying the vectors with the appropriate scalar values), we can assume that all the vectors ψ(i) are
different.
(1) The client generates a pair of keys (pk, sk)← KG(1k) for an additively homomorphic cryptosystem PKE = (KG, E,D),
and publishes pk.
(2) The server chooses at random a vector v⃗ ∈ (Zq)r such that all the shares si = v⃗ · ψ(i), for i = 1, . . . ,N , are different.
This step can be done, if necessary, at the same time as the assignment of vectors ψ realizing Γ is chosen.
(3) The server chooses at random a value s′ different from the value s = v⃗ · ψ(D).
(4) The server makes public ψ , v⃗ and s′. He defines infoC = (ψ, v⃗, s′, pk).
5.2. 2nd protocol: request and retrieval
In the t-th execution of this protocol, the client C wants to retrieve the item dbit . Assume that the subset of indices that
C has queried (including this it ) are allowed, i.e. B = {i1, . . . , it} ∈ BC .
(1) The client solves the system of equations

x⃗ ·ψ(D) = s′, {x⃗ ·ψ(ij) = sij}j=1,...,t

, obtaining a solution x⃗ = (x1, . . . , xr) ∈
(Zq)r .
(2) The client encrypts vector x⃗ coordinate-wise, to obtain c⃗ = (c1, . . . , cr) = (Epk(x1), . . . , Epk(xr)). He also encrypts the
share s˜it = sit , to obtain c˜it = Epk(s˜it ).
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(3) The client sends c⃗ , c˜it and a standard oblivious transfer (or private information retrieval, PIR) query for the index it to
the server.
(4) Using the homomorphic properties of PKE and the value c˜it = Epk(s˜it ) received from the client, the server transforms
the original database DB intoDB = {dbj}j=1,...,N , beingdbj = Epkγj(sj − s˜it )+ dbj,
where γj are random elements. If the query is correct, i.e. s˜it = sit , then we have that dbit = Epk(dbit ), whereas dbj is an
encryption of a totally random element, for j ≠ it .
(5) The server considers the oblivious transfer (or PIR) query from the client, over the transformed database DB, and
performs a conditioned disclosure (see Section 2.3) of the corresponding answer, under the condition
t
j=1

N
i=1

x⃗ · ψ(i) = si ∧ s˜ij = si
   
x⃗ · ψ(D) = s′ .
(6) The server adds c˜it = Epk(s˜it ) to infoC .
(7) If the client has behaved honestly, he obtains the correct answer dbit to the oblivious transfer (or PIR) query, he decrypts
it by using sk and recovers the desired item dbi.
Again, as it happened in our first solution, the security of this second protocol for restricted adaptive oblivious transfer
directly infers from the security of the employed cryptographic primitives. On the one hand, the query of the client does
not reveal anything about the index it to the server, because all the information is encrypted, and because of the privacy
properties of the standard oblivious transfer (or PIR) protocol that has been used. On the other hand, due to the properties
of the employed secret sharing scheme and protocol for conditional disclosure of secrets, the client can obtain only subsets
of items of the database that are allowed to him. The formal proofs for the security of this proposal, which are done by
reduction to the security of the employed primitives, are omitted due to their simplicity.
5.3. Some remarks
• Note the importance of the fact that all the shares si must be different. If this is not the case, and si = sj for some i ≠ j,
then the client can send Epk(si) along with an encryption of a correct solution x⃗ (if retrieving dbi is allowed at the current
execution), whereas the attached oblivious transfer (or PIR) query corresponds to the (possibly not allowed) index j. The
dishonest client would finally obtain the (possibly forbidden) item dbj.
• If the client knows a priori all the allowed queries that he is going to make, he can solve the whole system of equations,
obtain a solution x⃗ and use this same vector for all the executions. If the server is aware of this fact, he can use a chaining
technique, such as the one described in the theoretical solution of Section 4 (using random elements u0, u1, . . . for the
chaining), to ensure that the client behaves correctly in each execution. In the first execution, the condition for the
disclosure would be
N
i=1

x⃗ · ψ(i) = si ∧ s˜i1 = si
  
x⃗ · ψ(D) = s′  u = u0.
Whereas, in the t-th execution, for t > 1, the condition for the disclosure would be
N
i=1

x⃗ · ψ(i) = si ∧ s˜it = si
  
u = ut−1

.
.
• Private Information Retrieval (PIR, for short), introduced in [13], is a very similar concept to that of 1-out-of-N oblivious
transfer (recall Section 2.1), with the difference that the ‘privacy for the server’ requirement is removed. In other words,
the client may eventually obtain information about other entries dbj different from the one he is querying for. In our
protocol for restricted adaptive oblivious transfer, a standard PIR query can be used instead of oblivious transfer, because
the other entries dbj that the client could obtain, do not give any information at all about dbj to the client, provided all
the shares si are different.
• For simplicity, we have considered that the access structure Γ = (BC )c admits a vector space secret sharing scheme. If
this is not the case, we know anyway that Γ admits a linear secret sharing scheme, which can be seen as a generalized
vector space one, where each player i can be associated to more than one vector:ψ(i)(1), . . . , ψ(i)(ℓi) ∈ (Zq)r , and so he
will receivemore than one share: s(1)i , . . . , s
(ℓi)
i ∈ Zq. Our protocol can be easily extended to this case. The only precaution
to be taken is to ensure that all the indices i are associated to the same amount of vectors, so that the query of the client,
which includes encryptions of the shares associated to the desired index, does not leak any information about this index.
This can be achieved by adding, if necessary, ‘‘dummy" vectors to some indices; the dummy vectors added to an index i
must be linear combinations of the real vectors already associated to i.
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6. Conclusions
We have presented in this work the first solutions to the general problem of restricted adaptive oblivious transfer. The
first one uses public key cryptosystems which are at the same time additively andmultiplicatively homomorphic. Instances
of such cryptosystems have been proposed very recently in the cryptographic literature. Our second solution does not need
fully homomorphic encryption, and makes use of a conceptual relation between restricted adaptive oblivious transfer and
secret sharing schemes.
As future research related to this work, we canmention two possibilities. The first onewould be to improve the efficiency
of our solutions, regarding the required efforts for computations and communications. The second one would be to modify
our schemes so that they provide anonymity for the clients, which can be a desirable property in many real applications.
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